is the border of freedom of speech? One of the expressions that are not protected by the law is fi ghting words and hate words. e second are libel and slanders that are understood as a infringement of somebody's rights. 2 e issues of these two kinds of expressions are the topic of this article. Enacting the First Amendment and its extension in the Fourteen Amendment 3 guarantees the possibility to express somebody's own opinions (also off ensive) for what there is no sanction. One of the forms of expression is libel, which is divided into: (1) insult (expressing to somebody an unfavorable opinion, gesture or act in public place with the object of his or her humiliation, discredit or destroy his or her reputation); (2) slander (humiliating somebody in public by unfair ascription or accusing for things that slandered person has not done). Libel is long-term, cultural and social. e essential issue to penalize these two forms of expression is attendance of the third person (public opinion) and the proof that the author of the opinion was aware in testifying falsehood or telling untrue information without checking its credibility (it concerns both private persons or public fi gures). Private person has a wider range of protection of law. In spite of this, private person has to prove the author of the libeled opinion that it was untrue and that he (or she) has not preserved so called duty of care when he was checking the information. 4 e fact is that the author of the libeled statement has full freedom of speech until the victim of the libel has not sued him and not proven that the information was untrue and the author did not check it in a proper way. Moreover, the utterances which aim is e.g. to spread the panic or false alarm and to testify falsehood in court are not considered as a manifestation of some-body's own views. In the interpretation the First Amendment, the judges of the Supreme Court do not consider it literally but they also take its restrictions into account. 5 In the United States the range of freedom of speech is very wide. Public fi gures that were libeled have less protection of the law than the private persons. e consequence of that situation is the possibility to criticize (and even off end) the state, the government, politicians, the nation and the fl ag. It is because the authors of the First Amendment thought that every person has the right to possess and express its own opinion, also that ones which are critical for the government.
In Poland this order is reverse. Public fi gures have more protection of the law than private person. e example is the jurisdiction of the Polish Supreme Court: "even if the information announced by journalist is true, his activity can be considered as an illegal because of its demagogic, humiliating person that considered, way of showing. " 6 In Poland public fi gure 7 can assert his rights not only by suing in lawsuit (by infringing personal rights) but also by bringing into action the trial (on the basis of art. 216 §2 of the Penal Code). 8 e idea of freedom of speech is well illustrated by judge Rehnquist: "the fact that society may fi nd speech off ensive is not a suffi cient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives off ense, 5 One of the examples is utterance of judge Oliver Wendell Holmes that "the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fi re in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the eff ect of force. e cite comes from the Schenck v. USA" case (1919) . Schenck v. U.S., http://caselaw.lp.fi ndlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase. pl?court=US&vol =249&invol=47 (31.12.2009).
6 I. Lewandowska, Informacja niewłaściwie podana, " Rzeczpospolita", 28-02-2003 Rzeczpospolita", 28-02- (ed. 2861 . In the issue of libel and penal liability Polish jurisdiction has to come close to jurisdiction of European Court of Human Rights, especially with the case Lombadro v. Malta.
7 Polish Criminal Code discerns three categories of public fi gures and punishes in diff erent way: president (to 3 years), public offi cer (to 1 year), other persons (including private person, to 1 year). Polish Criminal Code 06. 06.1997 , http://isip.sejm.gov.pl/servlet/Search?todo=file&id=WDU19970880553&type=3&name=D19970553Lj.pdf (31.12.2009 ).
8 Ibidem.
that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas." 9 Looking at that interpretation of the First Amendment, burning the national fl ag (one of the main American symbols) is considered as an expression of owns views. is opinion was pronounced in Texas v. Johnson 10 case in 1989. On its basis the Supreme Court acquitted the accused activist of the Revolutionary Party of Communists, Gregory Johnson who in this way wanted to express his negative opinion about Reagan's policy.
is act (profanation of the national symbol) was sentenced for one year in jail and the fi ne of $2000. Johnson appealed and the case reached the Supreme Court. Judge Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court: "if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society fi nds the idea itself off ensive or disagreeable. " 11 e statement of the Supreme Court in this case is clear: if some of the utterances are off ensive but they are not directed to concrete persons (but they concern a group of people), then they are protected by the First Amendment. is interpretation of the freedom of speech gives the opportunity to manifest one own's opinion, even if they are insults or off ences for others or 11 Justifying decision, judge Brennan referred to the case Street v. New York from 1966. Afro-American Sidney Street wanted to protest against national policy towards minorities and acting under the emotions, he burned national fl ag, commenting it we don't need no damn fl ag! Court of fi rst resort punished him, but Supreme Court decided that his words were expression of the freedom of speech (judges spoke only to Street's words not act). Judge John Marshall Harlan II claimed that although Street's utterance was off ensive for many, it was protected by the Constitution. Street v. New York, http:// straylight.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0394_0576_ZS.html (31.12.2009). they are in the form of protest against governmental policy. 12 It includes both secular and religion cases. is approach is extremely liberal, because it gives the opportunity of impunity "profane" as well as national symbols and objects of religious worship -also libeled the God. 13 In analyzing the libeled opinions it is necessary to ask the question about the degree of keeping duty of care and the amenability for a person who spreads false information. 14 How can it be proved that the libel or slander destroys somebody's good opinion and if the measures (in civil case) were suffi cient compensation? Is there a need to reach for punitory measures? Answers on these questions can delimit the freedom of speech. e range of libel can be very wide -from making an opinion, through gestures to some behavior (e.g. not shaking hand, turning away from somebody or disregard). What for one is an insult, it can be acceptable for another. American jurisdiction is very liberal for this kind of utterance. 15 e border of the freedom of speech was marked in New York Times v. Sullivan case in 1964. 16 L.B. Sullivan, who was a commissioner, felt being libeled by the publication in New York Times about the actions against civil 12 Jurisdiction changed legislation in 48 on 50 states. In the same year brought into eff ect Flag Protection Act whose role was protecting of the fl ag, especially against profanation, burning or trampling. e law was abolished a er the decision in case United States v. Eichman in 1990. Eichman burnt fl ag in protest of the bill that breached the First Amendment. Judge Brenan, author of the opinion of the Court claimed that: "punishing desecration of the fl ag dilutes the very freedom that makes this emblem so revered, and worth revering". United States v. Eichman, http://www.esquilax.com/fl ag/eichman.html (31.12.2009 rights protesters, some of them inaccurately, some of which involved the police force of Montgomery in Alabama in 1960. 17 Although in the news there was no information about his surname, he felt responsible for his subordinates and sent a request to newspaper to correct the article. In the opinion of the Sullivan, in the article there was untrue information which libeled him (destroying his good name) as a public offi cer. e New York Times did not publish a correction in response to the demand, so Sullivan sued them. Sullivan won $500,000 in an Alabama court decision. e New York Times appealed in the name of the First and the Fourteen Amendment. In 1964 the case reached the Supreme Court. Judge Brennan, who prepared the opinion of the Court, claimed that the basis to penalize the author of the libeled publication was the necessity to prove that this news was direct to defendant and included false and humiliating information in the eye of public opinion. Additionally it is important to indicate that the person who published libeled news did it with the premeditation because he knew that it was untrue or during checking the information he did it by default (it is called actual malice). Because it included a libel of the public fi gures, Brennan claimed that the defendant had to prove that he had written was true, even if it was critical. is statement of the Supreme Court has made the authors of libeled opinions or publications to take responsibility for their words and acts (the value and the quality of the information could be/have been better). e defi nition of the libel has protected public fi gures from lies told or written in actual malice and it also has given the possibility to sue every critical and unfavorable information. e jurisdiction created a general defi nition of libel public fi gures and appointed the line of policy for the next decades. Writing his opinion, judge Brennan underlined the aim of the authors of the First Amendment -the freedom of speech and political debate, without the interference of the government. In the famous sentence, describing the idea of the First Amendment, he claimed: "thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi cials. " 18 However, the defi nition of public fi gures is quite narrow. e issue that appeared was to describe persons who did not perform public functions but in spite of that they infl uenced and created public opinion. 19 Among that kind of people was Jerry Falwell, an American evangelical Christian pastor and televangelist. In 1983 erotic magazine, Hustler, published information about pastor's "fi rst time". It turned out that it was only a parody of an advertisement of alcohol, Campari. 20 Falwell sued the magazine, with argumentation that publication of his surname and photo in that kind of magazine insulted his good name, libeled him, was an invasion of privacy, and -what was the most important -caused emotional damage. A jury acknowledged that Larry Flint (the publisher of the magazine) intentionally caused a damage, but he did not libel pastor (at the bottom of the advertisement there was information not to take it seriously). In spite of that they awarded Falwell $150,000 in damages. Flint appealed, invoking the First Amendment. What is more, he considered Falwell a public fi gure (the person who infl uenced public opinion) so pastor was less protected by the law. judge Rehnquist claimed that public fi gure, without distinction of the fact if it was an public offi cer or a famous person, had no rights to call for a compensation for emotional damages that were caused by malicious or unfavorable article unless he proved that it included false and libeled information and the author of the opinion was aware that he had published untrue views. e Judge said also that the First Amendment is a fundamental right that each person has. e aim of the freedom of speech is unlimited fl ow of the opinion and views on public topics. anks to guarantees included in the First Amendment, the society has right to independent opinions, without fear that they would be called for criminal responsibility. What is more important, each person has right to criticism that resulted not only from diff erent opinions and views but also from other motives -i.e. basic motives like aversion to second person. e border has to be the truthfulness of the information. Judge Rehnquist confi rmed the essence of the freedom of speech in these sentences: "the fact that society may fi nd speech off ensive is not a suffi cient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives off ense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas. " 23 Concerning the main plot of the case, i.e. libel of Falwell in Campari's advertisement, judge claimed that it was extremely diffi cult to delimit libel, because it was based on "outrageousness in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression, and cannot, consistently with the First Amendment, form a basis for the award of damages for conduct such as that involved here. " 24 Rehnquist rejected false idea that is the protection in the name of freedom of speech, false opinions and views. Resuming the statement of the Supreme Court in the libel's issue, especially including public fi gures, it is important to pay attention to the following circumstances: these kind of persons have less protection of the law 26 ; published information on their topics are protected by the law, unless they are slanders for things that they have not done and the author of this information gave this information with full awareness that is was untrue.
Public fi gures have to be aware that he (or she) could be criticised and it not necessary would be nice and cultural. Proving in court own rights could be very diffi cult (but this person has rights to raise their objections). What the Supreme Court took under full protection of the law were these kind of views which could be unpleasant (e.g. caricatures). In this case, what could decide about guilt or its lack are subjective criteria (opinion of other people), which the Court found unacceptable as infringing the idea of freedom of speech.
However, the defi nition of a libel is not the same in all states. Except for Arizona, Arkansas, Mississippi, Missouri and Tennessee there are other kinds of libel utterances that are understood per se. It is not necessary to prove that its character is a libel. It includes: reproaches about trade, business or profession that can cause damages; insults on "impurity" (especially concerning women); insults on diseases (mental, leprosy); accusing of criminal activity.
Reassuming the considerations about libel, it is important to take into account the fact that the Supreme Court interpreted this kind of utterance lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=CASE&court=US&vol=418&page=323 (31.12.2009 in an extremely liberal way. Freedom of speech has two sides -an author who wants to manifest his views that could be insulting for others, and the recipient who is insulted has also rights to defend their good opinion and name (but not necessary with compensation).
e second category of utterances include aggressive and fi ghting words. e featured jurisdictions and the arguments of the judges show that it is still a huge subject of the cases which has caused lot of controversies, especially at our, European point of view. And it is not still forbidden.
"You are a God damned racketeer' and 'a damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists' the same being off ensive, derisive and annoying words and names. " 27 For these words directed to City Marshal, Walter Chaplinsky was arrested and fi ned. In view of a public prosecutor, he violated state law of New Hampshire which said:
Was it possible in the Unites States, in the country where the freedom of speech is protected by Constitution? Chaplinsky appealed claiming that his rights were encroached (upon the First and Fourteen Amendments). Furthermore, he maintained that public offi cers were still exposed to verbal attacks and malicious publications, so he treated his utterance as an expression of the freedom of speech. In 1942 the case reached the Supreme Court. Judge Murphy, the author of the opinion, created two-their theory for understanding the First Amendment relied on "well-defi ned and narrowly limited. " 29 In this way, the judge explained that although the tenor of the First Amendment suggested that this freedom is absolute (not limited of any legislation), there are some categories of utterances that are not protected by the law. One of them are so called fi ghting words. 30 e Supreme Court confi rmed that this category of pronouncement is short of ideas and social values. If some utterance is acknowledged as aggressive, it should be fulfi lled under the following circumstances: it must be directly addressed to other person or a small group of people; it could cause aggression (towards the author), violence or riots.
Creating the defi nition of fi ghting words a second category of utterance which was taken out of protection of the First Amendment has been shaped. It is quite narrow because it does not include vulgarisms and the opinions whose aim is to express emotions. ese kinds of utterances are fully protected by the law because of a load of emotions that it includes. Also the doctrine of fi ghting words does not contain views and opinions which are uttered in public places but they are not directed to specifi c people. In this way it was guaranteed that the freedom of speech in almost unlimited, although it is considered unmoral and damned by majority of society.
Accepting in 1942 the doctrine of fi ghting words created the border between the utterances which aim to spread hate (e.g. by propagating Fascist's and Nazism's ideologies, calling for aggression) and that which are aggressive because of a load of emotions but they are not directly dangerous to others. Delimitation was extremely diffi cult because on the one hand, it should be a free space for public debate and, on the other hand, it was necessary to prevent propagating and popularizing the ideas that could cause aggression and lead to hostility -co called hate speech. Europe "aggressive" ideologies were used by charismatic leaders to explain the necessity of mass extermination of the nations (especially Jews, Gypsies) in the aim of creating a living space (German Lebensraum).
In the 1950s the civil rights movement, especially against racial discrimination, had begun. Propagators' postulates of equality of rights were not always accepted by the rest of the society, especially in the South where they were found as insulting and destroying a fi xed public order. ere were various attempts to repress manifestations and to block demonstrators who were fi ghting for rights of Black people in the South. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was based on the sentence of the Terminiello v. Chicago case (1949) . 31 In this case judges admitted that although the utterances and opinions proclaimed by Arthur Terminiello were racist as well as the results that they could bring (aggression of his listeners), it was still an expression of freedom of speech. e Supreme Court claimed that state law (on the basis of which Terminiello was penalised) was contradictory to the Constitution. Judge Douglas who was an author of the opinion of the Court said that: "the vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion. (…) it is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is eff ected. e right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes. " 32 What is more binding, a political system guarantees a free public debate, especially on the controversial and provocative topics that can cause aggression and anger. e utterance "may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling eff ects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.
at is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, (…) is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to reduce 31 Arthur Terminiello made a racist speech during e Congress of Cristian Veterans of America. Police was feared that his speech can cause riots so police offi cer decided to arrest and fi ne him $1000. Terminiello appealed referring to the freedom of speech. Terminiello v. Chicago, http://caselaw.lp.fi ndlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=CASE&c ourt=US&vol=337&page=1 (31.12.2009).
32 Ibidem.
a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. " 33 is case was a test action. It guaranteed the fi ghters of the civil rights possibility to manifest their views, which were not infrequently provocative, without fear of being accused of riots or destroying public peace and punished for it. Paradoxically, the freedom of speech that had been guaranteed for racists, a few years later protected the fi ghters for freedom and civil rights.
On the one hand, cases from 1942 and 1949 gave wide range of freedom of speech but on the other, they could not guarantee a protection of the people whom fi ghting words concerned.
In 1969 a leader of Ku Klux Klan used freedom of speech to manifest his views. He demanded to deport Black people to Africa, Jews to Israel and at the end of his speech he threatened the president, the Congress and the Supreme Court "if they continue to suppress the white, Caucasian race. " 34 He was charged in the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County for "(…) the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform" and for "voluntarily assembl [ing] with any society, group or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. " 35 Brandenburg appealed and the case reached the Supreme Court.
In the opinion of the Court (per curiam) 36 the decision of the previous courts was illegal and infringed the rights of the First Amendment. e judges claimed that it was not allowed to forbid even this kind of utterances that propagate aggression and violence but they did not cause any direct eff ects (but only potential ones). It is justifi ed to forbid only this kind of pronouncements that aim to bring out immediate criminal actions and in situations when it is a real possibility to elicit aggression. It is so called "speech brigaded with action" 37 and only it could be regarded as a unprotected by the Constitution. Judge Douglas considered that responsibility for acts which are committed under the infl uence of the denounced words lie on the side of the author of the utterance. 38 Jurisdiction in the case Brandenburg v. Ohio was quite liberal. It has created a new limiting defi nition of the "fi ghting and hate words. " Judges admitted that all pronouncements that propagate aggression, violence, racism but do not bring out eff ects are legal and are protected as an expression of freedom of speech. e basis of this statement was "clear and present danger test. " It is not signifi cant if they are unmoral, off ensive and condemned by the majority of the society. It is important to emphasize that this opinion was proclaimed in the times of social segregation and discrimination, so it can be considered as a huge act of courage on the Court's part. 39 One of the utterances that are protected by the First Amendment are vulgarisms that in the 1971 opinion of the Court could not be forbidden because of their substantial content "that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric. " 40 37 Ibidem. 38 David R. Dow and R. Scott Shieldes from Uniwersity of Houston showed innovative interpretation of the clear and present danger test. In their opinion this test is unfi nished because it is based on the theory of the casual and consecutive connection and in American society it is variance with freedom of speech (the author of the utterance infl uenced on audiences' will). First Amendment can be limited only in a basis of three conditions: (1) the aim of author's utterance is causing directly action; (2) directly eff ect of the utterance is damage; (3) author's intention is to subordinate the listener -he committed crime in the infl uence of author's words. David R. Dow and R. Scott Shieldes, Rethinking the Clear and Present Danger Test, "Indiana Law Journal", autumn 1973.
39 Creating the judgment the Supreme Court referred to the clear and present dan gerous.
40 Paul Cohen was punished by Californian Court for wearing T-shirt with the inscription "Fuck the Dra " in the building in Los Angeles. Court referred to the "California Penal Code" (especially section 415) that forbids "behaviour which has a tendency In the Cohen vs. California case the Supreme Court affi rmed that only aggressive utterances that are directed to other person (or a small group) and which can provoke aggression are unprotected by the Constitution. Every other form, including an emotional one, but not directed at specifi c people is an expression of the freedom of speech. In this way the judges guaranteed freedom of expression not only to intelligent opinions but also to vulgar ones.
A year later, judges affi rmed that vulgar words are one of the kind of expressing one's opinion. e Supreme Court reversed the jurisdiction of the State Court of Georgia that penalized a man for riots (he protested against war in Vietnam) and telling a few vulgarisms to the soldier. 41 e range of the freedom of speech in the United States is so wide that it also includes protection of the utterances that propagate totalitarianism, racism and other extremist opinions. 42 On this interpretation of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court found burning of the cross in front of the house of an Afro-American as a freedom of expression. 43 is gesture was racist -in the tradition of the Ku Klux Klan it was the beginning of lynch. e judges claimed that penalizing R.A. V (he was juvenile) by the local court in Minnesota was in confl ict with the Constitution. 44 At the to provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb the peace. " Cohen v. California, http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/cas/comm/free_speech/cohen.html (31.12.2009 e rule reads as follows: "whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffi ti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, colour, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. " R.A. V. v. City of Saint Paul, op.cit. E. Kagan, e Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A. V. v St. Paul, Rust v Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, " e Supreme Court Review" 1992. same time they emphasised that the boy's behaviour was illegal but the prosecutor, instead of referring to the other law 45 referred to the doctrine of fi ghting and hate speech (as a form which is illegal). In the opinion of the judges the character of the First Amendment is universal -every person has been guaranteed the right to freedom of speech, also this kind of utterance that expresses aversion and hostility both towards a single person (e.g. a politicians) and the minorities (ethnic, religion, homosexual). As a reasons for the sentence judge Antonin Scalia claimed that "St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fi ght freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquess of Queensberry rules. " 46 On this interpretation of the decision of the Supreme Court, the judges affi rmed that it is not possible to forbid the main categories of the utterances (e.g. libel, slander) while at the same time only part of the fi ghting words was allowed, whereas the rest is forbidden by the society and the authority. Referring to the reason 47 courts broke right to freedom of speech, even when the utterance was regarded as an unprotected by the law.
Judges in elaborating a clear and present danger test and the defi nition of the fi ghting words show that they agree to propagate and develop the bad and dangerous ideas that do not necessarily cause direct eff ects but they can bring indirect consequences (they can create a psychological ground). On the other hand, there is no certainty that forbidding every kind of utterance can prevent any indications of discrimination and hatred towards to minorities. But it can conciliate the group who propagates forbidding this expression.
Compared to Poland, the doctrine of fi ghting and hate words is more limited. According to art. 256 of criminal code "off ence is committed by anyone who promotes a fascist or other totalitarian system of state or incites hatred based on national, ethnic, race or religious diff erences or for reason of lack of any religious denomination. tions of totalitarianism and Fascist views is forbidden and condemned by the majority of society and according to art. 257 "off ences are committed by anyone who publicly insults a group within the population or a particular person because of his national, ethnic, race or religious affi liation or because of his lack of any religious denomination or for these reasons breaches the personal inviolability of another individual (but to sexual minorities). " 49 e problem of protecting sexual minorities against fi ghting words is still not regulated by the law. In Western Europe (e.g.. in Sweden and in Holland) and in Canada it is diff erent. Any kind of persecution and discrimination of gays is penalized.
e freedom of speech is also limited in art. 55 Act of Institute of National Remembrance where it is written that anyone "who publicly and contrary to the facts denies crimes referred to in art. 1, point 1 (the Nazi and communist crimes, other crimes against peace, humanity or war crimes) shall be subject to a fi ne or the penalty of imprisonment of up to 3 years." 50 is rule penalizes any totalitarian and racist utterances and the ones denying facts i.e. Holocaust denial. Similar rules are in force in most of the European countries and conventions. For example, the European Convention on Human Rights in article 17 "provides that no one may use the rights guaranteed by the Convention to seek the abolition or limitation of rights guaranteed in the Convention. is addresses instances where states seek to restrict a human right in the name of another human right, or where individuals rely on a human right to undermine other human rights (for example where an individual issues a death threat). " 51 On the basis of art. 10 and art. 17 the European Human Rights Court has dealt with a few cases that included the questions of freedom of speech and its limitation by doctrine of fi ghting words.
In 2004 in Norwood v. United Kingdom case, a right-wing party appealed from the decision of the British court that punished activists of the party for hanging anti-Muslim poster. Representatives of the party referred to the art. 10 of the Convention concerning freedom of speech. Judges stood on position that such attack against a religious group is not in accordance with values which are proclaimed in the European Convention, especially with tolerance and prohibition of discrimination. is act could not be protected in the name of art. 10.
In other case, Jersild v. Denmark from 1994, a broadcasting station was punished because of emitting documentary programme about juveniles who propagated racists views so called Greenjackets. During the interview "three Greenjackets made abusive and derogatory remarks about immigrants and ethnic groups in Denmark. " 52 e interviewer was also punished. All of them appealed to the European Court (ECHR) referring to freedom of speech. Judges decided that the author and the station did not breach the law because the character of the programme was documentary and the audience could foresee its form. With regard to Greenjackets the Court decided that their opinions were not protected by the art. 10 of European Convention. 53 General statement on the fi ghting and hate words the Court came from Gunduz v. Turkey case from 2003. e judges claimed that human dignity and respect are the fundaments of the democratic society. Referring to these values "there could be no doubt that expressions that sought to propagate, incite or justify hatred based on intolerance, including religious intolerance, did not enjoy the protection of Article 10 the Convention. However, in the Court's view, merely defending the shariah, without calling for the use of violence to establish it, could not be regarded as 'hate speech' . In view of the context, the Court found that it had not been convincingly established that the restriction was necessary. " 54 e basis of the jurisdiction was the analysis of the context, essence and aim of the hate speech.
Looking at presented cases it could be seen that the range of freedom of speech in Poland and in Europe is not as wide as in United States. All utterances propagating Nazism, communism and Holocaust denial are unacceptable and forbidden. Also anti-Semitic opinions are forbidden. 55 It is insignifi cant that there is no cause-consequence relationship. All utterances that are fi ghting words, hate speech, propagating racism, discrimination are penalized. It does not matter that there is no connection between reason and result. e cause of that thinking is historical experience, related to World War II and war in Yugoslavia (genocide, totalitarianism, crimes committed in the name of ideology). On the other hand, the American history is full of racism occurrences. But it is easy to see that American people do not have such complexes against discrimination and persecution like the Europeans. e role of the European Courts is checking if there is any abuse of law and if there is necessity to refer to the limitation clause. First of all, European judges take human dignity into consideration and the main rules that they consider are the rules of usefulness and proportionality. Analyzing American cases and jurisdictions in which propagators of Nazism, Fascism and hate speech have won, one can have an impression that the aim and proportion have been lost somehow. e human dignity looses in the confrontation with the freedom of speech. 
